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FREDERICK

I.

INTRODUCTION
Most states have adopted bias crime statutes that enhance the penalties

of convicted persons whose wrongdoing was motivated by prejudice against a
group with salient characteristics.' Nevertheless, some writers and legislators
continue to dispute the legitimacy of those laws. Proponents have expanded
their advocacy to the national arena, arguing that currently available criminal civil rights laws are insufficient.' On August 4, 1999, Frederick M. Law-

rence testified before the House of Representative's Committee on the
Judiciary in favor of enacting a proposed federal bias crime statute (Lawrence
Alexander Tsesis is a visiting scholar with the Institute for Legal Studies at the University of Wisconsin Law School and visiting assistant professor with the Chicago-Kent College
of Law. He wishes to thank Brad Hooker, Philip Pettit, Chin Liew Ten, and Shelly Kagan
for helpful conversations on philosophical aspects of this project. He also benefited from
discussions with Frederick M. Lawrence and Andrew Taslitz on criminal motive and intent.
1. These statutes, and even their definitions for "bias crime," or the alternative "hate
crime," vary substantively from state to state. For a comparative analysis of state laws see
Jenness and Grattet 2001, 73-101. Jacobs and Potter argue that these sorts of crimes cannot
be accurately tracked because of the states' definitional discrepancies (1998, 29-44).
2. In 1993, Frederick M. Lawrence published an article containing a list of federal criminal civil rights statutes. Those statutes, which are still good law, include 18 U.S.C. § 241
(conspiracy to violate civil rights), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of rights under color of
law), 18 U.S.C. § 245 (intimidation, interference, or injury of federally protected activities).
Lawrence devotes chapter 6 of PunishingHate to discussing historical and contemporary issues
surrounding the federal prosecution of bias crimes.
© 2003 American Bar Foundation.
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1999-2000), known as the Hate Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA). The act
would have amended title 18, section 245, to require federal prosecution of
some bias crimes over which federal courts currently have no jurisdiction.
At present, the Department of Justice can prosecute bias crimes only when
the perpetrator willfully selects a victim because of his or her race, color,
religion, or national origin and if the attack takes place while the victim
is exercising a federally protected right. The HCPA would have extended
coverage to persons victimized because of their sexual orientation and disability. Further, the HCPA would have removed the jurisdictional requirement that the victim be engaged in a federally protected activity. Persons
convicted under the proposed act would have been subject to enhanced
penalties. The Senate initially passed the measure, but it failed to win
enough support in the House and the congressional conference committee
eliminated the measure from the final version of the appropriation bill.3
That same year, Harvard University Press published Lawrence's book
Punishing Hate, which provides a sociological and foundational theory of
bias crime law. The elegance of the book lies in Lawrence's concise yet
comprehensive style. Punishing Hate addresses three main questions: Ought
a society devoted to equality punish bias crimes differently from other
crimes; that is, should it enhance penalties for already existing crimes when
they are motivated by bias? May a country committed to freedom of expression enhance the punishment of bias crime? And, do the federalist
provisions in the Constitution prevent the national government from prosecuting and punishing bias crimes (p. 2)? For the last decade, Lawrence has
been, arguably, the most influential authority on these subjects, providing
intellectual sustenance both for his supporters and detractors.
In determining which groups should be protected by bias crime legislation, the key element, Lawrence argues, should be whether the perpetrator
was motivated by bias (p. 64). While he does not define bias, he contextually
appears to mean hatred for a statutorily protected group. 4 Lawrence's deepest
reflections about that topic are his consideration on the mental states of
persons who commit bias crimes, along with his discussion on the psychology
of ethnocentrism (pp. 29-39, 41-44, 58-63, 64-73, 106-9).
Lawrence believes persons who are motivated by discriminatory animus
warrant more severe punishment because they commit more dangerous
crimes than individuals whose crimes are not so motivated (p. 63). Throughout the book he argues that when persons are targeted on the basis of their
3. The measure was reintroduced by Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee under the title
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2001 (introduced in the House), 107th Congress, 1st Sess.,
H.R. 74. Congress has yet to vote on the 2001 bill.
4. In his most direct statement about the meaning of bias, Lawrence adopts the definition
of the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, which refers to it as a "negative opinion or attitude
toward a group of persons based on their race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, or sexual
orientation" (p. 35).
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group status characteristics, they suffer more harm than those sustaining
injuries from parallel crimes: "This is why bias crimes warrant enhanced
punishment" (p. 95). I will follow his lead, primarily focusing on enhancement statutes. This should not, however, be construed to mean that there
is only one legal strategy for addressing bias crimes. In a recent study of state
statutes, Valerie Jenness and Ryken Grattet identify five types of bias crime
statutes-those that (1) criminalize the interference with civil rights; (2)
create new criminal categories; (3) embed provisions in statutes that refer
to other sections of the criminal code; (4) reclassify crimes committed because of the victims' group status; and (5) enhance criminal penalties (2001,
79-86). All of these are differing approaches to punishing crimes committed
from bias motives. Some writers, like Susan Gellman and John S. Baker
(Gellman 1991; Baker 2000), raise First Amendment concerns about including motive as a component of bias crime laws, and, in this essay, I will
examine whether punishing criminals more harshly because of their motives
is constitutionally justifiable.
Lawrence also surveys the underlying justification for bias crime laws
from the perspectives of retributive and consequentialist theories of punishment (pp. 45-51, 52). Retributivists believe criminal sentences should be
commensurate with the culprit-inflicted harm, while consequentialists hold
that the severity of sentences should be based on deliberations about how
best to deter future crimes. Lawrence does not explicitly embrace either
perspective, preferring instead to show that bias crime laws are consistent
with both schools of thought (p. 63). Lawrence asserts that proportionality
figures prominently in both theories, but he fails to evaluate whether either
of them sufficiently explains why enhanced punishment of bias crimes is
justifiable: "Proportionality is a key element on the justification for punishment. Whether through the retributive argument,... through the position
advanced by ...utilitarian theorists,... or through the contemporary eclectic theorists ... some crimes are [inescapably] worse than others and must
be punished more severely as a result (pp. 50-51). This conclusion leaves
unanswered whether punishment for bias crimes can be made proportional
by looking only at the gravity of the crime, which would be a retributive
position, or, as consequentialists would claim, that the social good it can
achieve must be the foremost part of the equation. Lawrence's neutrality
on this point is politic but not adequately reflective. Rather than taking
a definitive position, he seeks to demonstrate that both of the dominant
punishment theories support the enactment of enhancement statutes. Lawrence's approach leaves unexamined whether either school of thought best
justifies bias crime statutes, particularly when they conflict. This essay argues
that a mixed theory of punishment, which synthesizes retributivist and consequentialist ideas, most convincingly explains why bias crimes should be
punished more severely than crimes not motivated by bias. Lawrence briefly
discusses the mixed theory, but does not formally adopt it. For now, we need
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only be aware of retributivist and consequentialist claims, I will later have
occasion to analyze them.
Retributivist theory justifies punishment in terms of its relationship to
past acts. Retributivists believe that punishment should be both deserved
by an offender for his or her wrongdoing and proportionate to the offence
committed (McCloskey 1965, 250-51; Ten 1987, 5); it should inflict pain
against convicted wrongdoers in return for the suffering they caused (Primoratz 1989, 147). A primary implication of this theory is that it advocates
punishing criminals irrespective of (or at least ambivalent with regard to)
whether that course of action is useful for achieving broader social goods.
Consequentialist theories of punishment, by contrast, justify punishment in terms of its potential to deter, incapacitate, and rehabilitate perpetrators-its potential to produce good consequences. Within the context
of criminal justice, the good consequentialists seek is public safety, and laws
must employ techniques most likely (or at least as likely as any other) to
improve crime prevention.' Policymakers and adjudicators can gauge the
appropriate severity of punishment by determining its likelihood of reducing
crime.
I think a mixture of these two theories best explains why enhanced
punishments for bias crimes are legitimate. The differences between retributivist and consequentialist theories can be bridged by legislation that expresses social disapprobation of bias crimes.6 Retributivism appeals to the
empathic insight that the guilty should be punished, while consequentialism
reflects government's obligation to design a criminal justice system that assures citizens' security. Lawrence's argument in Punishing Hate would have
been even more powerful had he taken this approach. The mixed theory
comports with his judgment that bias crime laws punish culprits not only
because the harms bias crimes cause exceed those of parallel crimes (p. 4),
but also because they express some of the highest social values, namely, the
importance of intergroup harmony and equality (p. 8).
Before addressing the theoretical issues more fully, I begin by examining
what distinguishes bias-motivated crimes from other criminal offenses. I
then discuss the constitutionality of the motive element in bias crime stat5. Classically, consequentialists, like Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sidgwick, considered
social happiness or pleasure to be the greatest good that punishment should achieve. Modem
theories have adopted a more pluralistic approach to defining "the good," acknowledging the
desirability of factors other than just pleasure but continuing to maintain the ethical primacy
of pursuing good results (Kagan 1998, 61-63; Lichtenberg 1983, 545).
6. Proponents of the mixed theory, like H. L. A. Hart, consider the combination of

consequentialist and nonconsequentialist elements as necessary for a "morally tolerable ac-

count" of punishment to "exhibit ... a compromise between distinct and partly conflicting

principles" (Hart 1968, 1).

7. Lawrence's belief that punishment for bias crimes, like other criminal sanctions, plays

the indispensable, expressive role of condemning the wrongdoing (p. 163) is reminiscent

of Emile Durkheim's idea that criminal laws play an important role in manifesting social

disapprobation (see, e.g., Durkheim [1893] 1933, 108-9).
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utes. Last, I weigh retributivist and consequentialist theories and explain

why Lawrence's conclusions would be strengthened by adopting a mixed
perspective on punishment. I hope this essay will go some way toward showing that bias crime laws can be justified on a sound theoretical foundation
rather than on political vicissitudes.
II.

THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF BIAS CRIMES

Before discussing bias crime legislation in the context of various theories of criminal justice, we must know a bit about bias offenses and laws
against them. The most extensive compilation of demographic data on bias
crimes is that mandated by the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA),
which requires the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports Section to collect data
about the prevalence of bias crimes in the United States. The HCSA defines
bias crimes as "traditional offenses motivated by the offender's bias" (Federal
Bureau of Investigation 2000, 1).' The FBI's yearly report is compiled from
statistics voluntarily provided by state and local agencies. The information
so obtained has thus far been inconclusive about whether bias crime incidents are on the rise because "methodologies are both too new and too badly
flawed to give us an accurate picture of changes over time" (Perry 2001,
11). While the number of reported bias crimes continues to grow, so too does
the number of agencies reporting to the FBI. Further, the lack of reporting
conformity marginalizes the importance of the yearly report. Lawrence, too,
acknowledges that "these statistics remain inconsistent and incomplete"
(p. 20).
The ambiguity in the FBI's method of data collection raises skepticism
in some critics of bias crime laws. John S. Baker Jr., for example, argues
against bias crime laws in part because no empirical evidence exists indicating that there is a "'hate crime' epidemic." Instead, he writes, "advocacy
groups, the media, politicians and academic commentators" have manufactured an artificial crisis in order to further their agendas (2000, 1199-1202).
Baker's premises are too conspiratorial-purporting a subculture of self-interested professionals who flout an unsubstantiated perspective-to undermine the legitimacy of bias crime statutes. His approach leaves untouched
the underlying purposes behind bias crime policies, which are, after all, designed to reduce the risk to individuals and increase safety, regardless of
8. The HCSA uses hate crime rather than bias crime. Various writers have defended adopting one or the other of these terms. Either of them can refer to codified statutory guidelines
for sentencing persons who are found guilty of committing crimes motivated by prejudice
against a statutorily protected group. The controversy about which term more accurately

describes a culprit's state of mind issomewhat semantic. I prefer bias crime because it indicates

that discriminatory wrongdoing is not always accompanied by the feeling of hatred (it may,
for instance, mainly be fueled by disrespect). For a discussion about this controversy see Wang

1999, 800-801, 895-97.
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whether the number of victims of bias crimes is growing. Proof that there
is an increasing incidence of crimes motivated by bias could only bolster
the need for criminal legislation against them, but the argument in favor
of those laws can be embraced even if there is no "epidemic."9
Lawrence does not formulate a "definitive list of characteristics" of
groups that might properly be included in bias crime statutes (p. 13). He
settles, instead, on describing "the proper methodology for going about the
business of constructing such a list." He suggests that the state legislature
or city council should include criteria accounting for statewide and local
"social divides" (p. 13). This approach carries the risk that local prejudices
will produce divergent legal standards. The advantage of a federal law, such
as the proposed HCPA, is that it would protect groups even if state and
local legislatures excluded them. Lawrence suggests including gender and
sexual orientation as protected classes under a federal statute, both of which
many states currently include in the status provisions of their bias crime
statutes (pp. 14-20; Jenness and Grattet 2001, 94-97). In deciding on the
scope of coverage, Lawrence implies, legislators must include groups who
have historically been subject to widespread attacks, such as racial and ethnic groups. To this I would add that the categories of covered persons should
reflect the understanding that copycat crimes are often based on condescending cultural prejudices.
Bigots are motivated by inflammatory prejudices that inaccurately stereotype whole groups of people. I° Typically, bigots consciously select targets
who are the subjects of widely held stereotypes (Kleg 1993, 155).11 These
9. "Epidemic" seems to have been first used, sardonically, by Jacobs and Potter in their
opposition to bias crime legislation: "Advocacy groups for gays and lesbians, Jews, blacks,
women, Asian Americans, and disabled persons have all claimed that recent unprecedented
violence against their members requires special hate crime legislation .... Journalists and
academics have accepted the existence of a hate crime epidemic .... Minority groups have
good reasons for claiming that we are in the throes of an epidemic. An 'epidemic' demands
attention, remedial actions, resources, and reparations .... The uncritical acceptance of a
hate crime epidemic may well have negative sociopolitical ramifications. This pessimistic and
alarmist portrayal of a fractured warring community is likely to exacerbate societal divisions
and contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy. It distorts the discourse about crime in America,
turning a social problem that used to unite Americans into one that divides us" (1998, 6364). Jacobs and Potter's, as well as Baker's, use of the term is meant to trivialize the argument
by overinflating the claims of Lawrence and other advocates of bias crime legislation.
10. Prejudiced stereotypes are filled with derogatory connotations about groups whom
bigots brand unworthy of fair treatment. Individuals who internalize those stereotypes sometimes begin to perceive the despised groups as legitimate targets of aggression and channel
their personal frustrations against them (Delgado and Stefancic 1996, 478). Those stereotypes
can provide perceivers with rationalizations for committing crimes against the derogated group
(Hamilton and Trolier 1986, 143-44). For a more in-depth study of stereotyping and its effect
on cultural prejudices see Tsesis 2002, ch. 7.
11. Social context is an evocative backdrop that can offer bias-motivated criminals a
pretext for attacking members of a particular group (p. 41; Young 1990, 61). The violence
is committed against them for no other reason than their possession of salient characteristics,
whether they be racial, religious, national, gender, or other traits evoking bias animus. A
survey of history seems to reveal that certain groups are targeted in unique circumstances:
during economic crises, Jews are at greater risk because of the traditional stereotype that Jews
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attacks are unlike ordinary crimes, which tend to be random or arise from
personal conflicts (Lawrence 1994, 343). Bias crimes isolate victims because
they commonly reflect the intolerant sentiments of many people, rather than
only the culpability of an individual committing a particular act (Uhrich
1999, 1506-7). The perpetrators of prejudice-motivated crime tend to cause
more long-term harms than other criminals (Weiss, Ehrlich, and Larcom

1991-92, 27).
Victims of racial animus are often forced to make life-altering decisions,
such as moving from their neighborhoods, changing jobs, or avoiding public
places, to decrease existing or anticipated threats (Encyclopedia of Social
Work, 1990 supp., s.v. "ethnoviolence"; Wexler and Marx 1986, 210; Wang
1997, 123). For instance, homosexuals are often inhibited in expressing
themselves for fear that revealing their sexual orientation will make them
more vulnerable to attacks (Herek 1989, 948). Lawrence rightly concludes
that the stigma that typically accompanies bias crimes can lead to "humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred" (p. 41).
Bias crimes are distinct from others because of their effects on both
individuals and the targeted community and on the overall social stability.
Victims are doubly traumatized. They experience stress both because of the
underlying crime and for being singled out because of their race, ethnicity,
nationality, gender, or sexual orientation. Persons define themselves, to
some greater or lesser extent, by their membership in those groups. Thus,
crimes motivated by those characteristics hurt persons both materially and
existentially. For fear of being victimized, out-group members sometimes
even try to efface their identities, for instance by denying their Jewishness,
in order to avoid being associated with the denigrated group (Fanon 1967,
50-51, 191-93; Sartre 1948). The targeted community understands that
the conduct is meant to intimidate them and cause them to lose heart in
accomplishing their goals, whether that means joining a profession that has
historically been dominated by a more powerful group or living in a community that has always been racially or ethnically exclusionary. And, on a social
level, bias crime adds to intergroup tensions, reducing the degree of trust and
cooperation among various groups and thereby diminishing the exchange of
creative ideas for improving essential governmental functions such as the
provision of health care and other human services (Scotting 2001, 86266).
Perpetrators intend not only to harm the individuals they attack but
also to terrorize the vulnerable community. For example, the purpose of
burning a cross in front of a black church or spray painting a swastika on
a synagogue is not only to drive out their members from a neighborhood

hoard goods to the detriment of other groups; blacks are more likely than other groups to be
unjustifiably attacked by vigilantes avenging the rape of a white woman; and gays are the
more likely targets of hoodlums wanting to prove their manhood to domineering friends.
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but also to make other blacks or Jews living nearby apprehensive for their
safety (p. 42). Lawrence recognizes that bias crimes are unique because they
make more perilous the lives of out-group members:
A parallel crime may cause concern or even sorrow among certain
members of the victim's community, but it would be unusual for that
impact to reach a level at which it would negatively affect their living
standard. By contrast, bias crimes spread fear and intimidation beyond
the immediate victims to those who share only racial characteristics
with the victims. (P. 63)
Augmented penalties are, therefore, warranted for the commission of bias
crimes because they are more damaging than their parallel counterparts.12
After explaining why he regards bias crimes as more dangerous and
thinks penalties for committing them should be more severe than those
imposed for committing the underlying crimes alone, Lawrence turns to one
of the most controversial parts of his argument. Throughout PunishingHate,
and with greatest emphasis in chapter 4, Lawrence argues that "[b]ias motivation of the perpetrator, and not the resulting harm to the victim, is the
critical factor in determining an individual's guilt for a bias crime" (p. 64).
The "mental state of the actor," not the result of criminal conduct, is the
''most compelling basis for deciding whether an individual has committed
a bias crime" (Lawrence 1994, 368-69). Lawrence's formulation raises the
question, Do bias crime laws violate the First Amendment by punishing
people for their beliefs? Some critics embrace an absolutist First Amendment
reading, asserting that bias crime laws chip away at free speech protections.
Steven G. Gey, for example, states that making motive an important element in bias crime legislation "would permit the government to punish
antisocial beliefs and expression without establishing the existence of a
threatened harm independent of the one already punished by the original
criminal charge" (Gey 1997, 1069-70; see also Jacobs and Potter 1998, 11129; Gellman 1991, 333-34).
Motive ordinarily plays no role during criminal trials in determining a
defendant's guilt. The state must show that the elements of a crime were
committed and that the perpetrator had the requisite mental state.13 Typically, intent is distinguished from motive. Whether an actor had the requisite culpability to be convicted for the crime is a matter of intent, while
motive relates to the reason that a person committed the act. "Intent and
motive should not be confused. Motive is what prompts a person to act, or
fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is
12. Lawrence further believes that bias crimes can adversely reverberate to society as a
whole, not only to out-group members (pp. 43-44).
13. The influential Model Penal Code provides four levels of culpability: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence (1985, § 2.02(2)).
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done or omitted" (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s.v. "intent"). Lawrence,
however, believes that the "formal distinction between intent and motive
fails" (p. 109) and regards it as formulaic (p. 93).14 He proposes, instead, a
two-tiered model for adjudicating whether a defendant had the requisite
culpability for bias crime. Under his system, the prosecution must first prove
the mens rea of a parallel crime, for instance battery, and, second, show that
in committing that crime the defendant was motivated by bias (p. 95). As
with other adjudications requiring proof of motive, such as capital murderfor-profit sentencing hearings,' 5 the prosecution can use circumstantial evidence to prove that the crime was motivated by bias (p. 66). For example,
biased motive could be inferred if a person attacked members of a specific
out-group and perpetrated a crime while repeatedly shouting discriminatory
epithets.
Criminal law recognizes that some crimes hurt both individuals and
society more than others. In fact, to obtain a conviction for some offenses,
known as "specific intent" crimes, a prosecutor must prove that, beyond the
requisite state of mind (mens rea), the defendant had an additional reason
(motive or underlying purpose behind the volition) for acting. The added
impetus alters the classification of the crime. For example, breaking and
entering, which is a general intent crime, is the unauthorized intrusion into
a statutorily defined structure (e.g., a house). On the other hand, persons
can be convicted for a burglary, which carries a stiffer penalty than breaking
and entering, only if their intent to make an unauthorized entry is coupled
with the goal of committing a felony therein, as opposed to a misdemeanor
or petty offense (Finkelstein 2000, 911; Kadish and Schulhofer 1995, 218;
Taslitz 1999, 754). Similarly, treason requires supplying aid in order to help
the enemy (18 U.S.C.A. § 2381 [20011; Hart 1968, 125). Further, motive is
a relevant aggravating factor in the sentencing phase of persons found guilty
of murder for hire (United States v. Fontenot, 14 F.3d 1364, 1373 [9th Cir.
19941). Criminal law considers the motive to commit murder for pecuniary
14. This dichotomy between motive and intent somewhat artificial, as Lawrence points
out in an article published after PunishingHate. There he continues to assert that the "distinction between intent and motive fails" (Lawrence 1999-2000, 157). He makes two defenses
for incorporating motives into bias crime statutes against the charge that doing so violates
the First Amendment. On the one hand, "[plurely as a matter of positive law, concern with
the punishment of motivation is misplaced. Motive often determines punishment" in criminal
statutes (1999-2000, 155). In the alternative, Lawrence argues that "[w]hat is a matter of
intent in one context may be a matter of motive in another" (1999-2000, 157). The latter
alternative rejects the assertion that "motive" is distinguishable from the requisite mens rea
(mental state) of an offense. "The formal distinction ...turns entirely on what are considered
to be the elements of the crime" (1999-2000, 156-57). Thus, Lawrence argues, somewhat
persuasively I believe, that bias crimes may be described as either motivated by biased animus
or as intentionally targeting persons belonging to a statutorily protected group (1999-2000,

157).
15. The legislative determination that murder for pecuniary profit should aggravate the
imposed punishment indicates society's conviction that murder for money is worse than killing
for other reasons (Steiker 1999, 1866-67).
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gain to be an aggravating factor because it poses an even greater social danger than homicide committed for other reasons (Steiker 1999, 1866-67).
Courts also augment the punishment of individuals convicted of murdering
with the motive to collect insurance (McCord 1998, 23).
The offender's mental state also has a bearing on the punishment imposed for other criminal conduct. A perpetrator's motive for committing
homicide determines whether he is guilty of first-degree murder, seconddegree murder, involuntary manslaughter, or voluntary manslaughter. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a trial court hearing evidence in a
capital case can constitutionally consider whether a defendant was motivated by racial hatred to decide whether the crime warrants the death penalty (Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949-50 [1983]). The culprit's motive
is also decisive in other sentencing decisions: A person who kidnaps another
to commit a sexual battery incurs more severe punishment than he or she
would for other forms of kidnaping (In re Joshua H., 13 Cal. App. 4th 1734,
1737 (1993); pp. 106-7). The use of motive is unquestioned in convictions
for murder, burglary, and kidnaping because it has so long been a part of
the law that its presence has become intrinsic to those crimes. Courts factor
motive into such a variety of criminal sentencing decisions that the controversy about its validity as a factor in bias crime legislation seems to primarily
reflect the latter's relative novelty (Steiker 1999, 1869).16
Just as in other criminal cases that require the prosecution to establish
motive, bias motive may be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by direct or
circumstantial evidence. Material evidence, such as the defendant's statements made during the commission of the crime, can be used as evidence
of bias animus.
The United States Supreme Court weighed in on the issue of constitutionality in Wisconsin v. Mitchell (508 U.S. 476 [1993]), finding that the
First Amendment does not prohibit states from enforcing penalty-enhancement laws with a bias motive component. The case arose when black youths,
who had just seen the movie Mississippi Burning, attacked a while male.
Mitchell, who instigated the violence, told the groups "There goes a white
boy; go get him" (508 U.S. 480). The defendant was charged with violating a Wisconsin criminal statute that enhanced penalties for anyone who
"[i]ntentionally selects the person against whom the crime.., is committed
...because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person" (508 U.S. 480, quoting Wis. Stat.
§ 939.645(1)(b) [1990]).
16. Courts have upheld the constitutionality of criminal civil rights statutes in numerous
contexts. These federal statutes prohibit persons with racist, bigoted, and xenophobic motives
from interfering with, injuring, and intimidating victims to prevent them from engaging in
any enumerated acts, including fair housing practices, and from interfering with victims' privileges and immunities under color of law (18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (enumerating acts); 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (under color of law); 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (fair housing)).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court had reversed the conviction, finding
that the enhancement statute violated the First Amendment by punishing
some but not all points of view (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 169 Wis. 2d 153, 163
[1992]). To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court found that motive under the Wisconsin statute "plays the same role ... as it does under
federal and state antidiscrimination laws" (508 U.S. 487). The statute
"aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment" (508 U.S. 487).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote for the unanimous Court, placed special
emphasis on title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Employers can fire persons at will, unless their termination decisions are based on the employee's
race, color, gender, national origin, or religion (Kalam 2000, 599). Lawrence
elaborates on this point, writing that this distinction can only be understood
in the context of particular legal strictures against bias-motivated firings.
"[TIhe only way to determine whether such a firing is legal or not" he writes,
"is to inquire at some level into the motivation of the employer" (p. 107).
The Court found that the Wisconsin legislature's conclusion that bias crimes
"inflict greater individual and societal harm" is a constitutionally legitimate
reason for enhancing the penalties for their perpetration (508 U.S. 486).
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to this principle in 2000,
holding that a statute can augment the penalties imposed on criminals motivated by racial hatred, so long as the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime with a bias motive
(Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 471-72, 476 [20001).
Critics of the Mitchell decision argue that it is unrealistic to assume
that bias animus can be proven. James Morsch, for instance, argues that the
subjectivity of personal motives makes the job of proving bias crime cases
almost impossible; people's motives are only known to them "as personality
and psyche" (Morsch 1991, 667-68). Similarly, Craig L. Uhrich states that
"the issue of punishing motive as an element of the crime is one with which
the criminal law is not adequately equipped to deal" (1999, 1528). Their
conclusions, however, overlook that the determination of motive, as we saw
earlier, has not proven problematic in the context of other criminal cases.
Other critics, most prominently Jacobs and Potter, rhetorically question whether "punishing crimes motivated by politically unpopular beliefs
more severely than crimes motivated by other factors itself violates our First
Amendment traditions" (1998, 129). Bias crime legislation does not increase
punishment for persons who simply express their prejudices; it only increases
punishment for those whose wrongdoing is motivated by prejudices (Phillips
and Grattet 2000, 580). The relevant question is not simply whether the
defendant hated members of the attacked group but whether the crime was
motivated by his or her bias animus.
The First Amendment tradition incorporates not only the ideals of free
speech but also those of equal protection. Andrew E. Taslitz (2000), for

HeinOnline -- 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 325 2003

325

326

LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

example, acknowledges that bias crime statutes have an expressive component but concludes that they can withstand First Amendment scrutiny. He
asserts that, originally, the First Amendment was indifferent to violence
perpetrated against blacks, the Constitution having been ratified to placate
Southern slavocracy. 1" But the Reconstruction amendments changed this
dynamic, and under the equal protection clause, bias-motivated violence is
no longer protected as a legitimate form of self-expression. Taslitz concludes
that the constitutional right to free speech does not extend to "raciallysubjugating expressive violence" (Taslitz 2000, 1379-98). Taking Taslitz's
reasoning a step further, legislation against bias-motivated wrongdoing is in
keeping with the constitutional tradition of protecting vulnerable minorities
against the whims of powerful in-groups. 8
Lawrence further divides bias-motivated crimes into two categories.
The first he calls the "discriminatory selection model." Culpability is determined, based on that model, by whether the offender discriminatorily selected a victim: "it is irrelevant why an offender selected his victim on the
basis of race or group; it is sufficient that the offender did so" (p. 30). This
model, which is based on the type of statute the Court upheld in Mitchell
(p. 30), "enhances the maximum penalty for conduct motivated by a discriminatory point of view more severely than the same conduct engaged in
for some other reason or for no reason at all" (508 U.S. 485). The second
is the "racial animus" model, which focuses on whether "a defendant has
acted out of hatred for the victim's racial group or the victim for being a
17. In its original form the Constitution contained several provisions protecting slavery,
such as the three-fifths clause, fugitive slave clause, and the slave importation clause. The
three-fifths clause reduced blacks to three-fifths the value of whites for purposes of representation; the fugitive slave clause prohibited nonslaveholding states from emancipating runaway
slaves and required their return to slave owners; and the slave importation clause countenanced continuation of the African slave trade until 1808. See U.S. Constitution, art. 1,
§ 2, cl.
3, partly repealed by U.S. Constitution, amend. 14, § 2; U.S. Constitution, art. 4,
§ 2, cl.
3, affected by U.S. Constitution, amend. 13 and art. 1, § 9, cl.1, which lapsed (see
generally Finkelman 1992, 969-70).
18. In Justice Louis Brandeis's concurrence to Whitney v. California, he explains this
purpose is intrinsic to the First Amendment: "Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, [the founding fathers] amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed" (274 U.S. 357, 377 [19271 [Brandeis, J., concurring], overruled on
other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 [1969]). Brandeis's insight, however,
fails to recognize that, even after the passage of the First Amendment, governing majorities
continued to tyrannize the black minority. The drafters of the Constitution did not incorporate any protections for their slaves' speech rights. Rather, they envisioned the First Amendment as a constraint against the censorship of the "political, scientific, and artistic discourse
that they and their class enjoyed" (Delgado and Yun 1994, 881-82). James Madison, who
was a principle architect of the First Amendment, was a slave owner, even though he recognized the institution was the nation's "original sin" (Madison 1867, 3:190). Before the Reconstruction amendments were ratified, violence against blacks was legally condoned in the South
in spite of constitutional protections on speech. And even after their ratification, bigots maintained the upper hand there with the passage of the black codes and the rise of the Ku Klux
Klan.
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member of that group" (p. 29). Lawrence's use of racialanimus is more narrow
than the scope of group categories Lawrence refers to in other parts of the
book."9 Calling it a "bias animus" model would have better served his design
to capture the hatred involved in attacks against persons based on their
race, national origin, sexual orientation, and gender. In spite of this minor
terminological flaw, Lawrence accurately identifies two analytically distinct
approaches to bias crimes. For clarity in my discussion here, I will stick to
his term for the second model.
The racial animus model emphasizes the centrality of the perpetrator's
hateful attitude. In contrast, under the discriminatory selection model, a
person may be guilty for attacking a member of an out-group even when
the offender has no generalized hatred for that group. For instance, a person
may steal from blacks in a community where law enforcement agents are
members of the Ku Klux Klan, knowing that neither the immediate victims
nor the black community will be able to turn for protection to the police.
Such a person may have little or no hatred for blacks but rather may want
to exploit cultural prejudices for personal, criminal gain. According to the
first model, the intentional selection of blacks qualifies the act as a bias
crime. On the other hand, someone who attacks blacks to express his or
her racist convictions commits a racial animus type crime. Lawrence prefers
the racial animus model. He writes that when discriminatory selection is
not accompanied by animus it should either not be punished as a bias crime
or be classified as "a lower grade of bias crime" (p. 79). Lu-in Wang, another
advocate for bias crime laws, offers a different perspective. Contrary to Lawrence's preference for the racial animus model, Wang believes laws should
reflect that persons more often commit crimes against out-groups for opportunistic reasons than because of hate (1999, 815, 899). She argues that limiting enhancement statutes to "animus-motivated crimes" is problematic
because the "racial animus requirement would exclude from enhanced punishment those criminals who have some reason other than group-based animus for targeting certain social groups." Many of those crimes, Wang points
out, are committed not by ideologues but by people motivated by greed or
bravado (1997, 129). Lawrence's and Wang's views are not wholly incompatible, because, where an opportunistic crime is accompanied by animus,
Lawrence would agree that it is a bias crime, although a less dangerous crime
than one driven primarily by group hatred. However, where a perpetrator
is unaware of the victim's group status and acts instead from wholly material
interests or the desire to increase his or her standing among violent friends,
Lawrence would not classify that as a bias crime (pp. 174-75). I would add
19. Possibly, this is an inadvertent inconsistency resulting from the fact that five out of
the seven chapters of Punishing Hate, including the one in which the two categories of bias
crimes appear, previously appeared in journal form.
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that enhancement statutes should reflect that bigots are not always motivated by animus but may also be motivated by some other prejudiced attitude, such as the disrespect for members of the targeted out-group.
A more difficult question is how to respond to crimes in which bias
is one of several motivating factors. In these cases, Lawrence writes, "bias
motivation must be a substantial motivation for the perpetrator's criminal
conduct" (p. 10).20 A trier of fact, then, must decide whether bias was a

trivial or substantial factor in choosing a particular victim (Phillips and
Grattet 2000, 581). In my view, if any variety of bigotry can be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to be a substantial contributing motive for a
criminal act, such wrongdoing is a bias crime.
This brief survey should suffice to create a foundation for my assessment
of the theoretical foundations of bias crime statutes. Before explaining why
I believe a mixed theory of punishment best vindicates the legitimacy of
those laws, I turn to some analysis of retributivist and consequentialist arguments.

Il.

THEORETICAL GROUNDING

In this section I deal with the theoretical justification for punishing
persons who commit wrongful acts with a discriminatory motive more
harshly than people who commit crimes without that motive. In chapter 3 of
PunishingHate, Lawrence articulates the legitimate governmental purposes
behind penalty enhancement statutes; ultimately, those laws must both condemn bias-motivated acts and improve pubic safety. Lawrence asserts that
"theories of proportionality and harm" warrant enhancing the punishments
for injuries sustained from bias crime and focuses on the two dominant
schools of punishment theory: retributivism and consequentialism (pp. 4651). As we saw in the introduction to this essay, the former focuses on rendering just deserts for past crime, while consequentialism aims at tailoring
punishment to "improve the overall welfare of society" (pp. 45-46).21
My intent here is not to present an exhaustive discussion of these theories but to demonstrate that the policies behind bias crime legislation are
based on rational aims of criminal justice. I hope to show that bias crime
legislation that punishes persons proportionately for past crimes and that is
also likely to decrease the frequency of bias crimes in the future provides
the most viable approach to realizing Lawrence's hope of putting an end to
20. Similarly, the California Supreme Court held that where there are several concurrent
causes of the crime, conviction requires proof that bias was a "substantial factor in bringing
about the offense" (People v. Superior Court (Aishman), 10 Cal. 4th 735, 736 [Cal. 1995]).
21. As Alfred C. Ewing, a leading theorist in this field, points out, both theories have an
educative component. Punishments can provide "a kind of moral education" about wrongful
conduct when they are "substantially just" and aim to achieve future good (Ewing 1927, 300).
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bias offenses (p. xi). In his discussion of punishment theories, Lawrence
concludes that no single theory persuasively explains why society should
more severely punish crimes motivated by bias. Instead, he is content with
a discussion about how other theorists have argued that proportionately
greater punishment can be supported by either a retributivist, consequentialist, or mixed theory of punishment (pp. 50-5 1). While he discusses these
three theories, Lawrence nowhere explicitly follows any one of them, and
this lack of commitment to a perspective of why enhancement statutes are
legitimate makes his argument less persuasive than it could otherwise have
been.
Lawrence begins his discussion of punishment theory by examining retributive theory, which "offers a justification of proportionality that is inherent in the very nature of punishment" (p. 46). Retributivists believe
punishment is the necessary response to crime, regardless of whether it
achieves anything socially beneficial. They claim that a just desert for a
wrongful act should be gauged by the severity of a crime. The focus of punishment is on retribution for misdeeds; the social utility of the punishment
is not relevant (Cotton 2000, 1315-16; Uhrich 1999, 1504; Murphy 1985,
158-59). Any good that the criminal law might achieve, such as increased
security, is said to be of secondary importance. When applied to bias crime,
the retributivist theory maintains that if a crime is motivated by bias, it
should be more severely punished because it has caused greater harm.
Whether enhancement statutes are likely to decrease future risks to outgroups is deemed to be irrelevant in deciding on the appropriate level of
punishment.
The most commonly held version of retributive justice is lex talionis,
the right of retaliation, which advocates rendering punishments that are
commensurate with the crime-the death penalty for murder, flogging for
battery, and so forth. Lex talionis largely went out of repute because theorists
recognize that inflicting suffering from revenge could never undo the evil
done. Sophisticated retributivists find reasons other than mere retaliation
for punishing wrongdoers (pp. 46-47; Primoratz 1989, 12). In recent years,
the vengeance form of retributivism has, for the most part, been supplanted
by Kantian concepts of retributive justice. The prevalent approach now professes that criminal punishments should be imposed in order to affirm the
criminal's dignity as a rational and autonomous person. The aim is to render
judgement against someone deserving punishment for committing a culpable act. A court is required to impose full satisfaction for crimes, even for
a relatively minor misdemeanor, regardless of any benefit that could be derived from the imposition of a more lenient outcome, such as a period of
supervision followed by dismissal of the charges. Proportionate retribution
must be imposed regardless of its usefulness, even though "this does not
exclude utility but only makes it secondary" (Kant [1797] 1965, 99-108,
131-33). Exacting a punishment that diminishes social welfare, say by harsh
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penalty statutes that contain no procedure for weighing extenuating circumstances (such as the amount of grief a particularly harsh judgment would
cause the criminal's family or whether the penalty is unnecessarily harsh to
incapacitate the offender from committing future crimes against the community), seems unnecessarily callous (Eckhoff 1983, 12). Without a careful
analysis of the social consequences of a contemplated punishment, the imposed penalty may be counterproductive to the fair administration of criminal justice.
In a seminal article, Herbert Morris argues that persons may be justly
punished for violating criminal laws in order to counteract the unfair advantages culprits attain through the offense. Morris believes that the punishment "restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from the
individual what he owes, that is, exacting the debt" (1968, 478). Morris is
on the right track. Punishing a person for a bias crime might restore some of
the community equilibrium and reapportion the unfair in-group advantage
gained by organized violent acts. That good, however, can only come in the
future, and then the justification is not merely retributive. The advantage
gained from putting a criminal in jail can never undo the specific harm.
Society can only hope that incarceration will rehabilitate-or at least temporarily incapacitate-the convicted person and inhibit others from taking
unfair advantage.
The retributive conception that thinks of punishment as a way of showing respect to culprits, by treating them as autonomous persons who can
recognize that they deserve the punishments they were dealt, is admirable
but also incomplete. Appeal to a bigot's sense of compassion for the victim,
for instance by testimony of affected persons during the sentencing phase,
may go some way to making perpetrators feel remorseful and understanding
the gravity of their crimes. Further, the criminal justice system can appeal
to defendants as rational persons by affording them procedural protections
against wrongful punishments and providing them with a right to an appeal.
These can help show a criminal the wrongs associated with bias crimes are
based on reasonable social aims. However, forced rehabilitation, which
claims to respect criminals without seeking to educate them, discounts defendants' mental faculty (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, 29, 128-29). In enhancing the penalties of persons convicted for bias crimes, it is unrealistic
to believe that they will all think being behind bars for a longer period of
time is a respectful gesture. It is more realistic to believe that society will
be able to convince some but not all culprits that bias-motivated actions
are egregious. A punishment scheme must, then, appeal coercively to those
who commit bias crimes who will not be convinced by rational arguments.
While retributive theory correctly emphasizes the need for individualized justice, it gives no guidance in deciding whether enhancement statutes
can effectuate a more secure communal life. The retributivist theory provides reasons for judging cases on their merits rather than exploiting persons
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as mere quanta in utility calculations. Its focus on individuals as autonomous, responsible agents accurately explains why mentally competent individuals should be held responsible for committing bias crimes: We expect
denizens to understand that it is irrational and harmful to attack persons
based on their having salient group characteristics. Retributive theory, however, fails to explain what good society may expect to achieve by imposing
different gradations of punishment. The reason lies in the anticipated benefits of a criminal justice system, which includes specific deterrence of culprits
and general deterrence of other unscrupulous persons. So, to divide the fair
administration of the criminal justice system from the resulting social benefits is to split the necessary means from the ultimate goal.
After his discussion of retributive theory, Lawrence turns his attention
to a consideration of consequentialist theories of punishment (pp. 48-50).
Classic consequentialists hold that punishment must serve at least three
purposes: deterring would-be wrongdoers, rehabilitating convicted criminals, and imprisoning criminals to prevent them from engaging in future
crimes (Hodgson 1967, 91). Consequentialist theory lends itself to empirical
studies since it predicts what policies would result in the best outcomes (Williams 1972, 92; Wendel 2000, 135). Its perspective is broader in scope than
retributive theory because consequentialism regards punishments not as responses to isolated occurrences, otherwise they would be unnecessary since
the inflicted harm cannot be undone, but as means to achieving some social
good. Punishment is only warranted if it can bring about some good, particularly increased security (Bentham 1843, 396; Bagoric and Amarasekara
2000, 131).
Punishments for bias crime would be justified under the consequentialist theory so long as they helped decrease the crime rate. At first look
this view is appealing because a punishment scheme that reduces bias crime
would clearly be socially beneficial. However, as Lawrence points out, a consequentialist perspective that is concerned only with the likelihood of the
offender committing future crime is problematic (p. 48); enhancement statutes would be untenable if they were instituted solely based on their utility function, without regard to proportionality. For example, the state may
be more likely to prevent misogynistic crimes if a conviction for purse
snatching, when committed out of gender animus, carried a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment and the sentence was known to always be enforced. However, our sense of justice recoils from this result because fair
sentencing gradations should not only be based on the likelihood of preventing later crimes but also on the degree to which a penalty is commensurate with the injured rights.
Another criticism which is often leveled against the consequentialist
theory of punishment is that it could achieve its intended effect by punishing
either an innocent or a guilty person (Pugsley 1979, 393). If all that matters
is deterrence, bigots could be dissuaded from acting on their prejudices even
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if judges convicted people they knew to be innocent. As long as no one
discovered the cynical plot, the greater good-a reduced occurrence of bias
crimes and an increased level of safety-could be achieved at the cost of
only a few innocent persons being fraudulently sentenced. Consequentialists
typically respond to this allegation by drawing attention to the breakdown
of trust in the legal system and the reduced sense of security other innocent
people would feel if and when they found out about the state perpetrated
ruse (see, e.g., Lyons 1974, 346-47; Pearl 1982, 280-81). Indeed, punishing
the innocent would not really increase public safety; to the contrary, it
would increase anxiety. But even though it can respond convincingly to
the innocent victim argument, consequentialism does not explain why the
government breaches a public trust by punishing the innocent. That reason
is beyond the scope of utility-maximization considerations; it is found in a
prima facie ethical rule that legislatures must institutionalize substantive and
procedural legislation against punishing persons who are not guilty of wrongdoing.
While bias crime prevention clearly should be a principal goal of enhancement statutes, sentences should also be proportionate to an act that
infringes on other people's rights. A theory of punishment should integrate
those concerns into a beneficial policy. That theory must redress the rights
of victims while not trampling the rights of the guilty. The foundation of
such a theory, I believe, lies in a form of consequentialism that integrates
retributivist concerns for fundamental rights.
Recent consequentialist scholarship recognizes the insufficiency of
seeking only to maximize overall pleasure and adopts a broader conception
of teleological goods. Thus, Lawrence's statement that consequentialism
"draws its justification from a utilitarian rationale" (p. 46) is not precise.
Consequentialism goes beyond utilitarianism in reflecting not only on what
increases pleasure but also which laws will assure an equitable and fair distribution of social benefits. Pluralistic consequentialism acknowledges the
value of developing a governmental strategy for redressing wrongdoing that
is likely to augment physical security but also recognizes that legislators must
formulate policies for assuring that well-being is equitably and fairly distributed.22 Discriminatory impediments to a more vulnerable group's ability to
share in the common good, such as the use of public places of accommodations, are socially undesirable. Even if removing discriminatory hurdles and
providing special opportunities to oppressed groups will reduce overall hap22. Pluralistic consequentialists continue to recognize, along with their traditional utilitarian colleagues, that government is obligated to improve their subjects' pleasure. However,
they embellish this view with the realization that other goods, such as the fair administration
of justice or the heightened commitment to equality, are valuable policy matters that are
worth achieving, even when they are not accompanied by heightened utility (Kagan 1998,
61-63). This broader concept of what is good continues to maintain that the state must
pursue ends which are likely to augment overall (human) well-being (Griffin 1992, 118-19).
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piness, such a course may be the right one to take. 3 As John Rawls points
out, even if both masters and slaves live better than they would have in a
state of nature, that does not make slavery just because "[tihe benefits and
burdens of social cooperation are unjustly distributed" ([19671 1999, 135).
In his classic study on the two concepts of rules, Rawls explains how
punishments can function both prospectively and retrospectively. He points
out that legislators formulate the institution of punishment according to
how it can best further social interests, while judges must make impartial
retributive decisions based on particular cases (Rawls [1955] 1999, 22-23).
Thus, in the context of bias crime legislation, the legislature should consider
how to improve safety and deter future crime, while the trier of fact must
weigh evidence to decide whether the defendant committed a crime with
substantially biased motives.
Rawls's perspective of consequentialist punishment parries the criticism
of criminal theorists like R. A. Duff, who characterize consequentialism as
disrespectful of culprits because it does not treat them as a moral agents who
are capable of rational reform (Duff 1996, 48-50). The sentencing stage is
the opportunity for the convicted to offer mitigating evidence against a
harsh penalty that would not serve any reformative function. That is also
when the prosecution can indicate the extent to which the defendant committed the crime from bias animus, whether he or she was trying to incite
intergroup conflict or committing an isolated act, and whether the defendant is a recidivist. But the sentence is not merely reformatory, otherwise,
as C. L. Ten points out, persons who sincerely repent before being sentenced
should not be institutionally punished (Ten 1990). Legislators enact bias
statutes not only to reform criminals by appealing to their rational faculty
but also to deter them and others by threatening with incarceration those
persons who will persist in bias motivated wrongdoing, even after being exposed to rational persuasion. Penalty enhancement statutes can be designed
24
to both deter criminals and treat them fairly.
The crux of my argument is that a mixed theory of punishment, which
acknowledges the communicative role of enhancement statutes, can best
justify bias crime legislation. Lawrence falls short of explicitly adopting that
23. In making this estimation, an ethical consequentialist needs to take care not to replace one prejudice with another, because that will again lead to discrimination and detract
from the equitable distribution of social goods.
24. The criminal justice system should attempt to appeal to the criminal's empathic
sense. The instructive element of punishment should make clear, through workshops and
enhanced penalties, the degradation associated with his or her prejudiced behavior.
In part, enhancement statutes appeal to people's imaginations. The law anticipates that
upon seeing how much a convicted person is forced to suffer for acting on bigotry, others
will develop an aversion for experiencing the same suffering by imagining themselves in the
convict's place. They will then be more likely to eschew bias crime (concerning the deterrent
effect of empathy see Kupperman 1982, 324-25). On the other hand, cruel and unusual
punishment will likely have the opposite effect: people will feel sorry for the mistreated convict, and then the deterrent effect of empathy will be lost.
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position. As H. L. A. Hart put it, "a plurality of different values and aims,"
reflecting retributive and consequentialist principles "are relevant at different points in any morally acceptable account of punishment" (1968, 3).
Pure consequentialism leaves open the possibility that bias crime statutes
will serve a deterrent role through unnecessarily harsh penalties and the
persecution of innocent persons for the sake of some presumed greater good.
With pure retributive theory, the problem lies in explaining why enhancement statutes are necessary at all: If punishing offenders for committing a
bias crime is meant solely to requite them as moral agents, who will acknowledge their wrong when it is pointed out, then why not educate them about
the harm their crime caused without taking away the amenities of civil society, such as liberty and franchise. 5 Bias crime legislation, like all criminal
law, should both respect convicted persons as rational individuals (Duff
1986, 298-99) and penalize them forcefully enough to deter others from
later acting on bias animus.
It follows that punishment decisions are best made with an eye to
retributive and consequentialist predicates. The retributivist perspective
has the advantage of paying attention to rights, both those of the victim
and the accused, and the consequentialist has the superiority of distinguishing the means and ends of punishment. When these two are combined,
punishments for bias crimes can more effectively protect human rights and
further general welfare.26
The differing gradations of punishment should communicate the extent
of harm done and the sought-after aim. Lawrence regards bias crimes as more
harmful than parallel crimes both because of the "culpability of the offender
and harm caused to the society" (p. 51). Once a court has determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is responsible for the crime and
25. Herbert Morris made significant arguments for a paternalistic system of punishment
that can lead a guilty person to comprehend the evil committed to others, elicit a sense of
guilt about the crime, "reject the disposition to do what is wrong," and be conscious of his
or her worth as a responsible individual who is accountable for wrong actions (Morris 1981,
263-64, 271). His theory, however, does not explain how long to incarcerate nonresponsive
criminals who do not change their disposition (Sprigge 1965, 275). For this, a deterrent
concept of punishment isnecessary in which grades of punishment incorporate generalizations
about how best to prevent future crime.
26. Those two ideals are asserted in the U.S. Constitution, in the human rights protections of the due process and equal protection clauses and the government's requirement to
assure overall well-being in the preamble's general welfare clause. There is also some indication that the Framers intended government both to maximize social welfare and protect individual rights. See, e.g., The FederalistNo. 31, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the
object of government should be "the public good and ... the sense of the people"); The
Federalist No. 44, at 280 (James Madison) (noting that "the rights of Humanity must in all
cases be duly and mutually respected"); The FederalistNo. 47, at 289 (James Madison) (arguing
that the public good is the supreme object that government should pursue); The Federalist
No. 62, at 380 (probably James Madison) (stating that "[a] government implies two things:
first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a
knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained"), all in Clinton Rossiter
ed. 1961.
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any mitigating circumstances have been taken into account, the institution
of enhanced penalties for bias crime, which is meant to send a message about
society's lack of tolerance for it, must govern the parameters within which
final punishment will be set. Enhanced punishment regimens express that
"causing physical injury to a victim because of the perception that the victim
belongs to one of the specified groups creates a harm to society distinct from
and greater than the harm caused by the assault alone" (Oregon v. Plowman,
838 P.2d 558, 563-64 [Or. 1992]). Communication through punishment
appeals to persons' rational faculty, putting them on notice of the elevated
27
penalties and thereby coercing them not to commit those wrongful acts.
The vitality of bias crime legislation lies in its ability to express the
government's commitment to protecting human rights and increasing the
overall good. Enhancement statutes send the message that bias crime is particularly egregious, and criminal punishments play an essential role in relating what interpersonal behavior will not be tolerated by the polity. Laws
aimed at preventing persons from acting on their bigotry can help reduce
intolerance by altering social outlooks (Matsuda 1989, 2360-61; Abel 1998,
97). Lawrence, too, holds that view; he writes that bias crime legislation
"constitutes a societal condemnation of racism, religious intolerance, and
other forms of bigotry that are covered by that law." Enhanced punishment
schemes denounce biased attitudes and announce the values society seeks to
cultivate are "racial harmony and equality" (p. 167).28 The extent to which a
polity recognizes the risks associated with bias "is a significant statement of
its values and its sense of equality" (p. 3).
As persuasive as PunishingHate is, Lawrence's examination of bias crime
legislation could have been even more difficult to gainsay had he systematically developed it in the context of a mixed theory of punishment. On close
examination, that approach, with its mandate that the proportionality of
sentences reflect the intertwined government obligations to redress the infringement of fundamental rights and to increase public safety, most convincingly explains the relevance of bias crime legislation. Such legislation
communicates society's great disapprobation of crimes motivated by bias animus and seeks to deter their commission. On the one hand, Lawrence's
explanation of enhancement statutes from both the retributivist and conse-

27. The coercive message of bias crime statutes is preferably only a preliminary step to
instilling an aversion to bias-motivated wrongdoing. But those laws will be required so long
as persons who reject the rational message of bias crime statutes can be swayed by the deterrent
lesson of enhancement statutes. It strikes me that shifting the "behavioural disposition or
deliberative habits" of criminally disposed bigots will require some rehabilitative program,
which will need to be parsed in another article, that will sensitize them to the plight of the
group whose member(s) they attacked. Socialization is more likely to have a lasting effect
on persons' characters than mere coercive action (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990, 81-82).
28. Here, Lawrence would have been more comprehensive if he used "intergroup harmony" rather than "racial harmony," since he believes bias crime legislation should include
protections for a variety of historically disadvantaged groups (pp. 11-20).
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quentialist perspectives is politic because it might well sway academics from
both schools of thought. On the other, we must look beyond the commendable aim of gaining widespread support for bias crime legislation to discovering the most persuasive justification for it.
A multifaceted society should enact legislation that punishes bias-motivated criminal behavior severely enough to increase the public safety of its
citizenry. The mixed theory approach serves a civic purpose, because when
vulnerable groups feel secure they are more likely to live productive lives,
and when criminals perceive that they are treated with dignity they are
more prone to reform their prejudiced behavior.

IV.

CONCLUSION

PunishingHate shows Lawrence to be the leading United States scholar
on social and theoretical principles underlying bias crime legislation. The
book details why bias crimes differ from parallel crimes, how they cause more
damage than other crimes, their constitutionality, and the role of the federal
government in their prosecution. 9 Its ideas are the culmination of years of
study and writing on the subject. The thesis of the book would, however,
be strengthened by a consistent application of the mixed theory of criminal
punishment, but this is a very modest criticism. Whether I am correct must
now await empirical research to determine whether an enhanced punishment scheme that respects convicted persons as moral agents capable of
reform in fact deters them and others from committing bias crimes.
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if they have the requisite mens rea for a parallel crime coupled with a bias motive for committing it (p. 95). On the other hand, Lawrence argues, while hate speakers are motivated by
bias animus, they lack the mens rea to commit a parallel crime. "The speaker of racist speech,
however, does not seek to cause injury to a particular victim and thus lacks the mens rea
associated with a parallel crime" (p. 96). Lawrence's treatment of the subject overlooks the
long-term dangers posed by persons and organizations who disseminate substantially dangerous
biased invective. I have dealt with this subject at length elsewhere (Tsesis 2002, 140-47;
Tsesis 2001, 849-58; Tsesis 2000, 737-40).
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